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Youthfulness Matters:
A Call to Modernize Juvenile Waiver Statutes
by CHELSEA ELLEN HEANEY*
Introduction
Jennifer Pruitt was sixteen years old when she was sentenced in
adult court to life without the possibility of parole for a guilt-by-
association, felony murder offense.' Jennifer's father, Denny Pruitt
was a severe alcoholic who would beat Jennifer until her eyes were
blackened and began sexually abusing her when she was ten years
old Jennifer's mother called her a liar when she told her about the
sexual abuse.' Jennifer ran away from home, only to be brought
home by the police who told her to be grateful that she had two
parents.4
When Jennifer was about fifteen years old, she met Donnell
Miracle, a friend of Denny Pruitt's who lived close by with her infant
daughter) Donnell had also had a difficult childhood, and from a
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
would like to thank Professor Lois A. Weithorn, who provided invaluable guidance
throughout the writing of this Note. I would also like to thank the editors of the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly for their efforts throughout the editing process. Lastly, I
would like to thank my family and friends for their continued love and support.
1. Beth Schwartapfel, Sentenced young: The story of life without parole for juvenile
offenders, AUAZEERA AMERICA (Feb. 1, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/features/201
4/1/sentenced-young-thestoryoflifewithoutparoleforjuvenileoffenders.html. The felony
murder doctrine is "a rule that allows a killing that occurs in the course of a dangerous
felony, even an accidental death, to be charged against the felon as first degree murder. A
felon can be guilty of murder during the course of a dangerous felony even if the felon is
not the killer." Felony Murder Doctrine, CORNELL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/felony-murder-doctrine (last visited Apr. 29, 2015, 3:47
PM).
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young age, had been molested by multiple different men.6 Though
she was twenty-three years old, Donnell felt protective of Jennifer,
and the two became friends. On an August day in 1992, as Denny
screamed relentless obscenities at her, Jennifer decided that could not
take it anymore.8 She went to Donnell's house, and Donnell told her
that she would not have to endure the abuse any longer, and allowed
Jennifer to stay with her.9 Donnell was on welfare, with an infant
daughter to provide for, and Jennifer quickly began to feel that she
was a burden to Donnell.'1 After about five days of living together,
struggling to make ends meet, Donnell told Jennifer that she was
tired of being broke, and the girls devised a plan to rob one of their
neighbors, Elmer Heichel." Jennifer knew that Mr. Heichel went out
drinking with his friends on Saturday nights, and the two girls
developed a plan go to his home when he returned, distract him, and
take whatever money he had in his wallet.1 2 All seemed to be going
according to plan, until, when returning from the bathroom with cash
in hand, Jennifer found Donnell stabbing Mr. Heichel repeatedly in
the middle of the living room floor.13 Jennifer later learned from
Donnell that Mr. Heichel had attempted to grope her, and given her
childhood of abuse, this caused her to snap."
The judge presiding over Jennifer's case had two options.5 He
could either sentence Jennifer as a juvenile, which would have
required her release in three years when she turned twenty-one, or
sentence her as an adult, which, under mandatory sentencing laws,











16. Id. "Mandatory minimum sentencing laws require binding prison terms of a
particular length for people convicted of certain federal and state crimes.., these
inflexible, 'one-size-fits-all' sentencing laws ... undermine justice by preventing judges
from fitting the punishment to the individual and the circumstances of their offenses."
What Are Mandatory Minimums?, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS,
http://famm.org/mandatory-minimums/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2015, 3:23 PM).
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the judge chose the latter.7 Jennifer was sixteen years old at the time
of her crime and was sentenced in adult court, under the felony
murder doctrine, to life without possibility of parole.'8 She remains in
prison to this day, hopeful, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions,
that she may one day be eligible for parole.9
Jennifer's tragic story is representative of the stories of countless
juveniles housed in adult prisons throughout the United States.0 Due
to mandatory and automatic sentencing schemes, juveniles are
transferred to adult prisons without consideration of their upbringing,
maturity, and potential for rehabilitation. Recent Supreme Court
decisions considering the constitutionality of imposing severe
sentences on juveniles have drawn attention to the ways in which
juveniles end up in adult prisons throughout the United States.
This Note examines the constitutionality of state statutes that
allow for and mandate juvenile adjudication in adult courts. Part I
looks at the original development and purpose of the juvenile justice
system in the United States-it explores the reasons behind the
establishment of a juvenile justice system separate from the adult
criminal justice system, and introduces some of the early cases that
laid the foundation for the establishment of this system. Part II
provides a multistate analysis examining which states allow for
discretionary transfers from juvenile to adult courts, which states
allow for direct or automatic filing in adult criminal court, and the
constitutionality of such practices in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions. Part III considers empirical research on juvenile and
adolescent development, as well as recent Supreme Court decisions
addressing the constitutionality of sentencing juveniles in adult court
and subjecting juveniles to the most severe penalties available under
the law. Part IV discusses the physical and psychological impacts that
juveniles, sentenced in adult court, face when serving out their
sentences in adult prisons. Lastly, Part V offers a recommendation
for state legislators to abrogate direct and automatic placement
practices in favor of discretionary transfer laws that allow for, and
17. Id.
18. Schwartapfel, supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. Though Jennifer's case is representative of many, there are also many cases
involving juveniles whose stories are not as traumatic as Jennifer's, but find themselves in
similar situations where the underlying sentiments remain the same. Regardless of how
traumatic or not a juvenile's upbringing and family life is, these are factors that should be
considered before a juvenile is automatically transferred to, or sentenced in, adult criminal
court.
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mandate, the consideration of the unique factors associated with
youth, before transferring or filing a juvenile's case in adult criminal
court.
I. A Look to the Past: The Development and Purpose of the
Juvenile Justice System in the United States
The turn of the twentieth century brought with it the notion that
there are qualities of youth that make juveniles fundamentally
different from adults.21 The juvenile justice system emerged in the
United States as a means of protecting juvenile offenders, through the
states' parens patriae power, from the harsh realities of the adult
criminal justice system.
22
Reformers and progressives in the nineteenth century called for
the development of separate juvenile courts for delinquent minors.23
These individuals specifically rejected legal institutions as appropriate
rehabilitative services for children and, instead, promoted the
development of a more relaxed and even nonlegal, juvenile justice
system.24 The first juvenile court was established in Cook County,
Illinois in 1899.25 This court was representative of the ideals of the
reformers, with a focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment, and
on the child rather than the offense.26 The structure was less formal,
less legalistic, and based around a treatment model where the focus
was to diagnose and treat the delinquent minor, rather than to punish
him.27
21. DANIELLE MOLE & DODD WHITE, TRANSFER AND WAIVER IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2005), http://66.227.70.18/programs/juvenilejustice/jjtransfer.pdf.
These qualities include juveniles' immaturity, impetuosity, rehabilitative potential, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468
(2012).
22. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 913 (5th ed.
2014). "Parenspatriae, Latin for 'Parent of his or her country,' is a doctrine that grants the
inherent power and authority to the state to act as a guardian for those who are legally
unable to act on their own behalf." Parens Patriae, CORNELL LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parenspatriae (last visited Apr. 29, 2015,
3:29 PM).
23. DAVIS, ET AL.,supra note 22.
24. Id. at 916.
25. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 1. Within thirty years of the establishment of
this first juvenile court in 1899, virtually all of the fifty states had established a juvenile
court system. History of the Juvenile Justice System, DEP'T OF JUV. SERVICES,
http://www.djs.state.md.us/history-us.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2015, 3:38 PM).
26. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 1.
27. DAVIS ET AL.,supra note 22, at 916.
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The seminal cases surrounding the establishment of the juvenile
justice system in the United States include Kent v. United States in
1966, In re Gault in 1967, and In re Winship in 1970.28 In Kent v.
United States, the court held that, "an opportunity for a hearing which
may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver
order.,29 A year later, in In re Gault, the Court considered notice, the
right to counsel, and the right to confrontation as provided by the
Sixth Amendment, as well as to the right against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, in the context of juvenile
adjudication.°  The Court held that, "these four bill of rights
safeguards apply to protect a juvenile accused in a juvenile court on a
charge under which he can be imprisoned for a term of years."'"
Lastly, in In re Winship in 1970, the Court, citing Chief Judge Fuld's
dissent in the Court of Appeals, held that "'where a 12-year-old child
is charged with an act of stealing which renders him liable to
confinement for as long as six years, then, as a matter of due
process ... the case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."
3 2
In the decades following the establishment of the juvenile justice
system, a severe spike in violent juvenile crimes, beginning in 1985
and rising most significantly between 1988 and 1994, led many states
to change their policies regarding the treatment of juvenile
delinquents.33 In fact, between 1992 and 1994, forty-nine out of the
28. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 2.
29. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966). Morris A. Kent, a juvenile on
probation, was arrested and charged with housebreaking, robbery, and rape. After
admitting his involvement, his case was transferred from juvenile to adult court without a
prior waiver hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the Court of Appeals and
held that a pre-waiver hearing must occur before a juvenile's case can be transferred to
adult court. Id. at 564.
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). Gerald Francis
Gault was fifteen years old when he was committed as a juvenile delinquent after having
been in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a woman's purse. His
parents were not notified that he was committed and questioned, and he was not notified
of any Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. His case considered the extent that due process
rights should extend to juvenile cases. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 59-60.
32. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,368 (1970) (rev'd, W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196,
207 (1969)). Winship was arrested and charged with stealing $172 from a gym locker, and
his case looked at whether juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard when they are charged with violation of a criminal
law. When a child is charged with a crime rendering him liable to substantial confinement,
the court held, such a standard is required as a matter of due process. Id. at 365.
33. Brian Hansen, Kids in Prison: Are the States Too Tough on Young Offenders?, 11
THE CQ RESEARCHER 347, 348 (2001). From 1985 to 1994, the rate of murder committed
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fifty states broadened or enacted legislation making it easier for
juveniles to be tried as adults.4  Though juvenile crime rates have
consistently decreased since this peak in 1994, the legislative impact
of this era of high crime remains.35 The early protectionist parens
patriae emphasis that provided the basis for the development of a
juvenile justice system separate from the adult criminal justice system,
has faded since its inception in the late 1800s. It has been replaced by
the development of legislation that treats juveniles as "fully culpable
and competent adults.
36
II. Legal Responses to Juveniles in the Present: An Analysis of
the Modern Mechanisms that Facilitate Juvenile Entry
into the Adult Criminal Justice System
While waiver and transfer statutes are grouped and characterized
in a variety of ways, this section compares "judicial waiver" statutes,
in which a juvenile's case begins in juvenile court and may be
transferred to adult court, with "automatic waiver" statutes, which
allow a judge or prosecutor to surpass juvenile court and file a
juvenile's case directly in adult court.37 This section addresses how
the former is consistent with the aforementioned Supreme Court
decisions in that such statutes allow for the consideration of the
unique characteristics associated with youth in determining the
appropriate adjudicative steps to take.3 8 The latter, on the other
hand, fails to consider factors beyond a juvenile's age and offense
committed and is inconsistent not only with these recent Supreme
Court decisions, but also with the fundamental rationales that
underlie the development and purpose of the juvenile justice system.39
by teens, ages 14 to17 increased 172%. Per 100,000 population, the homicide rate by 14 to
17 years old in 1985 was 7.0, increasing to 19.3 in 1993, and 19.1 in 1994. JAMES ALAN
Fox, Trends in Juvenile Violence: A Report to the United States Attorney General on
Current and Future Rates of Juvenile Offending, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. (1996), http://www.bjs.govlcontent/publpdf/tjvfox.pdf.
34. HANSEN, supra note 33, at 347.
35. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 3.
36. Id.
37. See generally PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., Trying Juveniles as Adults in Criminal
Court: An Analysis of State Transfer Provisions, JUV. OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: NAT'L
REP. SERIES (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/232434.pdf.
38. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
39. Shari R. Kim, Parens patriae? Automatic waiver to criminal court and its toll on
youth and society, AMERICAN PSYCHOL. ASS'N (Oct. 2014), http://www.apadivisions.org/d
ivision-41 /publications/newsletters/news/2014/1 0innocence-research.aspx.
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Once a juvenile is transferred or waived to the adult criminal system,
regardless of the type of waiver, "they lose their legal status as
minor[s] ... and become fully culpable for their behavior."4 This fact
underscores the importance of considering a juvenile's culpability,
maturity, and rehabilitative potential before making the
determination that he should be treated, under the law, as an adult.
A. Judicial Waiver: An Examination of Discretionary, Presumptive,
and Mandatory Waiver Statutes Across the United States
Judicial waiver, comprised of three subcategories, including
discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory waiver, is the most
common transfer and waiver provision and is employed, in some
form, by forty-six out of the fifty states.41 Cases arising under judicial
waiver laws originate in juvenile court and, at the discretion of the
42
judge, may then be transferred to adult criminal court. Bound by
the Supreme Court ruling in Kent v. United States, all judges must
hold a preliminary hearing before waiving a juvenile's case from
juvenile to adult court.43 Kent not only authorizes, but in fact requires
judges to consider multiple factors when determining the
appropriateness of a transfer.4   However, a look at the three
subcategories within judicial waiver provisions, specifically
mandatory waiver statutes, reveals that such discretion may not
always be properly exercised.45
Generally, in most of thc forty-six states that employ
discretionary judicial waiver, "the law specifies factors a court must
weigh, findings it must make, and an overall standard it must apply in
40. JEFFREY BuTrs & ADELE HARRELL, Delinquents or Criminals? Policy Options
for Young Offenders, URBAN INST. 6 (1998), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/307
452_delinquents orscriminals.pdf.
41. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 6. "Discretionary waiver statutes specify
threshold criteria similar to those outline in Kent v. United States that must be met before
the court may consider waiver in a given case .... In a true mandatory waiver jurisdiction,
the juvenile court is called upon only to determine that there is probable cause to believe a
juvenile of the requisite age committed an offense falling within the mandatory waiver
law... . Presumptive waiver statutes designate a category of cases in which waiver to
criminal court is rebuttably presumed to be appropriate." Transfer Provisions, OFF. OF
JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION (Dec. 1998), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/tryingjuvas
adult/transfer.html.
42. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 6.
43. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
44. Id.
45. OFF. OFJUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 41.
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making its waiver decision.,46 More specifically, forty-four out of the
forty-six states apply standards and identify factors to be considered
when making a decision on waiver, based loosely on the eight factors
enumerated in Kent.47 Other states, including Kansas, Missouri, and
Virginia, have developed their own standards based on the eight
factors enumerated in Kent.48 Kansas allows waiver upon a finding of
"good cause," while Missouri and Virginia allow waiver whenever the
accused is not a "proper subject" for juvenile treatment.49 Oregon,
another state that doesn't abide strictly to the Kent factors, bases its
determination on whether the court finds that the juvenile has "the
capacity 'to appreciate the nature and quality of [his or her]
conduct."'5  While there exists variance in the execution of
discretionary waiver statutes amongst states, these provisions
represent an acknowledgement of the importance of considering
various factors associated with a juvenile's youth, before determining
whether or not he or she is suitable for juvenile, or adult, jurisdiction.
Presumptive waiver statutes are present in fifteen of the fifty
states; these shift the burden of proof from the prosecution, who has
the burden in discretionary waiver cases, to the minor.1 For each
state that has a presumptive waiver statute, that state designates
various offenses for which waiver to adult criminal court is deemed
appropriate.52 When accused of one of the designated offenses, a
juvenile is to be transferred to adult court, unless he or she can
sufficiently establish that such a transfer would not be appropriate.3
The 2005 report provided by the National Center for Juvenile Justice
identified the following three basic categories in which state criteria






51. Id. It is important to note that before a juvenile is required to come forward with
evidence of "amenability to treatment" as a juvenile to rebut the presumption that his/her
case should be transferred to adult criminal court, a prosecutor must first demonstrate
probable cause to believe that the juvenile actually committed the alleged crime. Id.
52. Id.
53. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 7. Of the fifteen states that employ
presumptive waiver statutes, four states require not only that a juvenile bear the burden of
proof at the waiver hearing to rebut the presumptive waiver, but also that the juvenile
must present "clear and convincing evidence" that a waiver is not justified. GRIFFIN ET
AL., supra note 37.
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based.54 Alaska is an example of a state where certain juveniles are
deemed "unamenable to treatment" and are subject to waiver based
on the crime they committed.5 States that conform to age-based
criteria focus on the age of the juvenile offender, independent of the
seriousness of the crime.56 In other words, an older juvenile who has
committed a minor crime that would not otherwise be subject to
presumptive waiver may still be waived to adult court based on his
age alone.7 Lastly, states such as Colorado, that support record-
based criteria, base the appropriateness of a waiver on the juvenile's
prior offense record.8
Though presumptive waiver statutes rightfully provide a juvenile
with the opportunity to demonstrate his or her suitability to juvenile
court, the criteria presented above is inconsistent with both early
findings in Kent and the recent findings by the Supreme Court in
Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and People
v. Gutierrez, which will be discussed below. 9 Limiting an analysis of a
juvenile's suitability to juvenile or adult court to an examination of
his or her age or offense committed improperly ignores individualized
levels of maturity, culpability, background, and personal
circumstances. Focusing solely on age and/or offense is misguided,
especially when using these factors to determine whether a juvenile
will have an opportunity to reform and rehabilitate in the juvenile
system. Instead, when a juvenile is faced with rebutting a
presumptive waiver transfer, a court should consider not only the
juvenile's age, but also the unique factors associated with that age, as
well as the juvenile's ability and potential to reform within the
juvenile justice system.
Of the fifty states, fifteen have enacted statutes allowing for
mandatory waiver of juvenile jurisdiction in cases that meet certain
age, offense, or other criteria.6° According to a multistate analysis
prepared by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
prevention, "[g]enerally, in a true mandatory waiver jurisdiction, the





59. Except, perhaps, for the record-based criteria, which considers a juvenile's past
criminal record when determining whether or not transfer to adult criminal court would be
appropriate.
60. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 8.
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juvenile court is called upon only to determine that there is probable
cause to believe a juvenile of the requisite age committed an offense
falling within the mandatory waiver law.",6' These statutes are
nevertheless classified as discretionary waiver provisions due to the
fact that they mandate only that courts consider waiver, and they do
not explicitly mandate that an actual waiver take place.62 Given that
these statutes do in fact mandate waiver upon a finding that an
offense meets certain statutory requirements, mandatory waiver
63statutes arguably are, as their name suggests, inherently mandatory.
Mandatory waiver statutes infringe upon a juvenile's due process
rights as presented in Kent by limiting a judge's discretionary
authority and, as a result, limiting the effectiveness of the pre-waiver
hearing that Kent requires. However, these statutes nevertheless
require a level of individualized consideration that is wholly absent
from the statutes discussed below in Sub-Part B. Though imperfect,
judicial waiver statutes (discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory),
serve as a baseline from which more appropriate statutes may
develop. These statutes, particularly the elements that support
judicial discretion and individualized juvenile assessments, should
inform legislation aimed at addressing the problematic effects of
"automatic waiver" statutes in the future.
B. "Automatic Waiver": An Examination of Direct File, Statutory
Exclusion, and "Once an Adult, Always an Adult" Statutes Across
the United States
"Waiver" is a bit of a misnomer in the context of direct file and
statutory exclusion statutes. Rather than originating in juvenile court
and later being transferred to adult court, juvenile cases subject to
direct file and statutory exclusion may have original jurisdiction in
adult criminal court.
Fifteen states have enacted direct file statutes that give
prosecutors the authority to surpass juvenile jurisdiction altogether by
directly filing a juvenile's case in adult criminal court.4  If a
61. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 5.
62. Id.
63. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 8.
64. Id. "Concurrent jurisdiction, or direct file, statutes afford prosecutors the
unreviewable discretion to charge certain juveniles in either juvenile or criminal court...
[f]indings reveal that direct file laws have little effect on violent juvenile crime." Benjamin
Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative Effects of State Direct File Waiver Laws on




prosecutor decides to directly file a juvenile's case in adult court, the
adult criminal court has original jurisdiction over the case, and the
juvenile court is never involved.65  Surprisingly perhaps, the
constitutionally required due process protection articulated in Kent,
that a juvenile court hearing must be conducted before a juvenile is
transferred to adult court, does not apply in direct file cases.66
The seemingly misguided rationale for this exemption is the
perception that prosecutors are more neutral than judges and
legislators-with judges frequently considered as soft on crime and
legislators seen as tough on crime. However, as noted by Marsha
Levick in a presentation at the Juvenile Justice Summit in 2002,
prosecutors may be influenced by ulterior motives or biases of their
own.' Specifically, Levick says, prosecutors may be operating under
pressure to appear tough on crime, which may be exacerbated by a
lack of experience dealing with juvenile offenders and offenses.69 To
make matters worse, the level of severity of offenses required to
trigger direct file may be lower than that required for presumptive or
mandatory waiver.0  In Arkansas, for example, the offense of
soliciting a minor to join a gang is sufficient to trigger direct file in
adult court.7
The discretion and authority given to prosecutors through direct
file statutes represent a great deal of faith and trust by state
legislators in not only a prosecutor's neutrality and objectivity, but
also in his or her ability to make such determinations in the first
place. Direct file statutes operate on the assumption that prosecutors
have sufficient knowledge and understanding of juvenile offenders
and offenses to determine, at their sole discretion, whether or not a
juvenile is fit for juvenile jurisdiction. Taking into account what a
juvenile stands to lose if transferred from juvenile to adult court, this
assumption is given insufficient consideration by state legislators
65. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 8.
66. See generally HOWARD SNYDER ET AL., Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court in
the 1990's: Lessons Learned From Four Studies, NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE (2000), http://www.ncjj.org/Publication/Juvenile-Transfers-to-Criminal-Court-in-
the-1990s- Lessons- Learned-From -Four-Studies.aspx.
67. Marsha Levick, Presentation at CWLA 2002 Juvenile Justice Summit, New
Orleans, La., Examining Transfer to Criminal Court As A Means of Reducing
Delinquency and Recidivism (May 8-10, 2002).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 37, at 4.
71. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 9.
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when enacting such statutes. By enacting direct file statutes,
legislators are already eliminating a juvenile's constitutionally
protected due process right to a pre-waiver hearing as required by
Kent. On top of that, allowing a single individual-who may or may
not be trained or knowledgeable in the area of juvenile law-to
determine the proper jurisdiction in which to file a juvenile's case, is
arguably an unconstitutional infringement on a juvenile's right to due
process.
Similarly, statutory exclusion statutes, which have been enacted
in twenty-eight states, "define particular crimes for which juvenile
offenders are automatically excluded from juvenile court
jurisdiction., 72 Again, these statutes, created by legislators, allow for
the preclusion of any consideration of the factors identified in Kent.
73
Juveniles whose cases are filed in adult court under statutory
exclusion provisions are treated as adults at the time they committed
their offense and are sentenced accordingly.74 Perhaps most notably,
Mississippi, a state that has enacted an extensive statutory exclusion
law, sends every seventeen-year-old accused of a felony into the adult
criminal justice system.75
Thirty-one states have enacted "Once an Adult, Always an
Adult" statutes, which require that once a juvenile is prosecuted in
adult criminal court, any subsequent case against them will be
72. Id.
73. Id. The Court in Kent identified the following factors for a judge to consider
when deciding whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction: 1) The seriousness of the alleged
offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires waiver;
2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or
willful manner; 3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted; 4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment; 5) The desirability of trial
and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the
alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia; 6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of
living; 7) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with
the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions; and 8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood
of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged
offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile
Court. Kent, supra note 29, at 566-67.
74. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 9.
75. Id.
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automatically transferred to adult court.76 Some states require an
actual conviction in adult court for this statute to apply, but others,
including California and Mississippi, do not.77 California's position is
that a juvenile is transferred to adult court not based on guilt or
innocence, but on a finding of unfitness for juvenile court. As such, in
California a conviction in adult court is not necessary to confirm
unfitness for juvenile court.8 Similarly, Mississippi does not require a
conviction from the first prosecution, provided that the subsequent
offense is a felony.9
C. The Result of Modern Waiver Mechanisms: An Examination of the
Demographics of Juveniles Incarcerated in Adult Prisons
As a result of the aforementioned waiver statutes, an estimated
250,000 juveniles are tried, sentenced, and incarcerated as adults in
courts throughout the United States each year.80 Of those 250,000,
most are charged with non-violent crimes.81 There exists a substantial
racial disparity throughout both the juvenile and adult criminal justice
systems, with minorities highly overrepresented in both arrests and
convictions.8
African-American youth constitute "62% of the youths
prosecuted in the adult criminal system, and are nine times more
likely than white youth to receive an adult prison sentence."8" Latino
youth are 4% more likely to be petitioned, 16% more likely to be
76. Id. at 10. Though most states that have enacted this statute require criminal
prosecution of all subsequent offenses, some require waiver of only a broadly defined
subset of these cases, i.e., those involving juveniles of a certain age, or those who have
committed a sufficiently serious offense. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 37.
77. MOLE & WHITE, supra note 21, at 9.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Neelum Arya, State Trends: Legislative Victories from 2005 to 2010 Removing
Youth from the Adult Criminal Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE 3 (2011),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJStateTrendsReport.pdf.
81. One category of nonviolent juvenile offenses includes status offenses, which
consist of conduct that would not be a crime if committed by an adult. See id. at 12; see
also M. Sickmund et al., Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement
(Oct.1, 2015), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/ 2011). It is a goal of the JJDPA to
deinstitutionalize juvenile status offenders and discourage the confinement of status
offenders after their adjudication hearings. Status Offenders, GETLEGAL, http://www.get
legal.com/ (search term: "status offenders").
82. Arya, supra note 80.
83. Neelum Arya & Ian Augarten, Critical Condition: African-America Youth in the
Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE 1 (Sept. 2008) http://campaignforyouthjus
tice.org/documents/AfricanAmerican Brief.pdf.
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deemed delinquent, 28% more likely to be detained, and 41% more
likely to receive an out-of-home placement than are white youth.8 Of
all the racial disparities existing throughout both systems, the most
severe occur for Latino youth tried in the adult criminal system.85
Latino youth are 43% more likely than white youth to be waived to
the adult system, and 40% more likely to be admitted to adult
prisonf." A report published in 2000 by the Justice Department along
with six leading youth foundations titled, And Justice for Some, does
not discuss why such severe racial disparities exist; however, Mark
Soler, the president of the Youth Law Center, suggests that rather
than resulting from overt racial discrimination, the cause of such
disparities is more likely the result of "the stereotypes that the
decision makers at each point of the system rely on."" Mr. Soler went
on to suggest that a judge may be influenced by the clothing one
chooses to wear or the lack of familial support a juvenile has.8
III. Empirical Research on Juvenile Development and Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Illustrate the Challenges Involved in
Sentencing Juveniles in the Adult Criminal Justice System
A. Goals of the Adult Criminal Justice System
According to the National Center for Victims of Crime, the
criminal justice system in the United States is "the set of agencies and
processes established by the government to control crime and impose
penalties on those who violate laws."89 Most criminal justice systems
are divided into three main institutions: law enforcement, the court
system, and corrections.90 These institutions work together to
promote the following four principle goals of the criminal justice
84. Neelum Arya, America's Invisible Children: Latino Youth and the Failure of
Justice, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE 2 (May 2009), http://www.campaignforyouthjust
ice.org/documents/Latino-Brief.pdf.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 6.
87. Fox Butterfield, Racial Disparities Seen As Pervasive in the Juvenile System, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/26/us/racial-disparities-seen-as-
pervasive-in-juvenile-justice.html.
88. Id.
89. The Criminal Justice System, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR VICrIMS OF CRIME, (last
visited Apr. 29, 2015, 8:47 PM), https://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-
help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/the-criminal-justice-system.
90. How Does the Criminal Justice System Work?, FINDLAW, http://www.findlaw.co
m/ (search: "how does the criminal justice system work?").
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system: retribution (punishment for crimes against society),
deterrence (prevention of future crime), incapacitation (removal of
criminals from society so that they can no longer harm innocent
people), and rehabilitation (activities designed to convert criminals
into law abiding citizens).9
In a recent article titled, The Mass Incarceration Problem in
America, Grace Wyler details some of the most pressing problems
related to the prison system in America today. Due in large part to
overcrowding and inadequate funding, America's prisons, the largest
prison population in the world, are facing severe problems.92 There
are currently more than 2.4 million prisoners housed in federal
penitentiaries, state corrections facilities, and local jails throughout
the United States, a number that has more than quadrupled since the
1980s.9' In her article, Wyler looks at these problems in relation to
the four principle goals of the criminal justice system, finding that the
relationship between increased prison rates and reduced crime is
"tenuous and small." 4 Such findings call into question how effective
our prisons really are in promoting the goals of the criminal justice
system.
In Coleman v. Brown, a case filed in California in 1990, the
District Court found that, due to prison overcrowding, prisoners with
severe mental illness were receiving inadequate mental health care in
violation of their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment.5 A Special Master who was appointed to oversee the
implementation of remedial efforts, reported twelve years later in
2002, that mental health care in prisons was deteriorating due to
91. Misty Kifer et al., The Goals of Corrections: Perspective from the Line, 28 CRIM.
L. REV. 47 (2003); see also, Purposes of Prisons, STOP THE CRIME, http://www.
stoptheaca.org/purpose.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2015, 9:10 PM).
92. Grace Wyler, The Mass Incarceration Problem in America, VICE NEWS (June 26,
2014, 6:05 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/the-mass-incarceration-problem-in-america.
93. Id. Wyler attributes this unprecedented rise to four decades of tough-on-crime
policies, and a "draconian war on drugs." Id.
94. Id. Wyler cites a news report by The Sentencing Project released in July 2014,
the same week she wrote her article, which found that three states-New York, New
Jersey, and California-that have reduced their prison population by about twenty-five
percent have seen their crime rates decline at a faster rate than the national average. Id.
(citing Marc Mauer & Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Fewer Prisons, Less Crime, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incFewerPrisoners-Less_
Crime.pdf.)
95. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917 (2011) (Note: Coleman v. Brown and Plata
v. Brown were consolidated and heard before a three-judge District Court in 2010. The
governor of California, Edmund G. Brown, appealed the decision in 2011.).
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increased overcrowding.96 In 2001, in a case called Plata v. Brown,
California conceded that inadequate medical care violated prisoners'
Eighth Amendment rights and stipulated to a remedial injunction.97
Over the course of the next few years, mental health and medical
services in prisons failed to improve due to continued overcrowding."
In 2010, the Coleman and Plata cases were consolidated and heard
before a three-judge court, which, after hearing testimony and
conducting extensive fact finding, ordered that California reduce its
prison population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years,
either by releasing prisoners or by increasing capacity by new
construction.99
In an era where states like California are being ordered to
release prisoners to alleviate overcrowding, we must question the
appropriateness of statutes that not only facilitate, but also mandate,
the transfer of juveniles into an already overextended adult prison
population. Juvenile facilities were developed to give juveniles, like
Jennifer Pruitt, a chance to rehabilitate and become contributing
members of society. Sentencing juveniles to time in adult prisons
undermines this fundamental purpose of the juvenile justice system
and, furthermore, contributes unnecessarily to the overcrowding that
continues to exist in prisons throughout the United States.
B. Research Reveals that Juveniles, and the Goals of the Juvenile
Justice System, Are Not Served When Juveniles Are Placed in
Adult Criminal Facilities
With the establishment of the first juvenile court in Cook
County, Illinois, in 1899, the early emphasis of the juvenile justice
system was on protecting and rehabilitating juvenile offenders, rather
than punishing them.' Due to the increase in juvenile crime between
1985 and 1994, a sense of fear about dangerous, juvenile offenders
swept the nation, leading state legislators to crack down on juvenile
crime and abandon the early goals of the juvenile justice system
96. Id. According to the Legal Information Institute at Cornell University, a special
master is an individual appointed by the court to carry out an action on the court's behalf.
Special master, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/specia
Imaster (last visited May 11,2015,1:06 PM).
97. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1947.
98. Id. at 1927.
99. Id. at 1923.
100. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Juvenile Justice: A Century of Change (December 1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9912_2/juvl.html.
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including guidance, protection, and rehabilitation.'0 ' As the juvenile
justice system has developed and changed since its inception in the
late 1800s, there has been a great deal of empirical research
conducted on juvenile and adolescent development. Two leaders in
the area of juvenile and adolescent research are Elizabeth Scott and
Laurence Steinberg, both former members of the MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and
Juvenile Justice.'a Professor Scott and Professor Steinberg released
an article in 2010 titled, Blaming Youth, addressing the question of
"how lawmakers should think about immaturity in assigning criminal
punishment to young offenders."'' 3
Scott and Steinberg characterize the juvenile justice reforms that
have occurred since the 1980s as "worrisome" and "highly
politicized," arguing that these reforms have been carried out in a
highly politicized climate, "driven by exaggerated public fears that
seem to be reinforced by illegitimate racial attitudes.""M' Scott and
Steinberg go on to say that recent policy reform is not simply a
coherent response to changing experiences, but rather that it fits the
pattern of what sociologists describe as "moral panic, in which the
media, politicians, and the public reinforce each other in an escalating
pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social threat."'0 5 Scott and
Steinberg view adolescents as a unique group of individuals deserving
a separate set of policies, procedures, and sanctions than younger




Consequently, they ask, "whether, and in what ways the immaturity
of adolescent offenders is relevant to their blame-worthiness and to
appropriate punishment for their criminal acts."'' 7 Relying on careful
and extensive analysis of the developmental capacities relevant to
101. Id.
102. "The MacArthur Foundation is a think tank that has provided influential
research for the formation of juvenile justice policy for the past decade." Lucy McGough,
Reviewing Rethinking Juvenile Justice, by Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg,
Louisiana State University Law School. "Elizabeth Scott, formerly of the University of
Virginia Law School and now the Harold R. Medina Professor at Columbia Law School, is
a highly regarded expert on issues of family and children's law. Laurence Steinberg,
whose specialty is adolescence, is a Distinguished Professor of Psychology at Temple
University." Id.
103. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REv. 799
(2003).
104. Id. at 800.
105. Id. at 807.
106. McGough, supra note 102, at 79.
107. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 103, at 800.
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adolescent criminal choices, in combination with the sources of
mitigation present in criminal law, Scott and Steinberg reject both the
early excuse-based model of juvenile justice and the emerging full-
responsibility approach.'" Instead, Scott and Steinberg arrive at a
compromise, a model in which "immaturity mitigates responsibility-
but does not excuse the criminal acts of youth who are beyond
childhood.' ' ""'
In their research, Scott and Steinberg identify two major
elements of adolescence, which they argue, distinguish adolescents
consequentially from adults in terms of their capacity for criminal
culpability." ° First, Scott and Steinberg rely on scientific evidence
that indicates that teens are simply less competent decision makers
than adults, "largely because typical features of adolescent psycho-
social development contribute to immature judgment..'". Second,
Scott and Steinberg argue that youthful involvement in crime is a
natural part of the youthful process of exploration and
experimentation, rather than an indication of future adult criminal
tendencies." ' As such, such involvement "reflects the values and
preferences of a transitory stage, rather than those of an individual
with a settled identity."" As a result, because youthful indiscretions
are often motivated by factors unique to adolescence, Scott and
Steinberg argue that youthful indiscretions are not reliable indicators
of a juvenile's eventual development into an adult criminal."4
As evidenced by Scott and Steinberg's research, due to the
influence of these developmental factors, youthful offenders are less
morally culpable and blameworthy than their fully developed adult
counterparts. Scott and Steinberg cite various studies, including one
by Jeffrey Fagan, indicating that juveniles are simply not amenable to
time spent in the adult criminal justice system, and in fact, face a
higher recidivism rate once released from adult prisons, versus
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 801.
111. Id.; Scott and Steinberg proceed to say that this immature judgment is the result
of reduced adolescent capacities for autonomous choice, self-management, risk perception





juveniles released from juvenile facilities."5 Far removed from the
nineteenth century progressive social reformers who classified
juvenile offenders as "blameless children," Scott and Steinberg argue
that contemporary lawmakers have "forcefully rejected this
[nineteenth century] paternalism, reclassifying young offenders as
adults," without considering the misfit that results from treating
underdeveloped children as adults."' Recent Supreme Court
decisions have begun to recognize the empirical research on juvenile
and adolescent development, as conducted by scholars such as
Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg, in ways that have begun to
shed light on how to appropriately place and sentence juvenile
offenders in courtrooms throughout the United States.
C. How Empirical Research on Juvenile and Adolescent Development
Has Influenced Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Beginning in 2005, with a Supreme Court case, Roper v.
Simmons, there has been a renewed interest in examining juveniles'
culpability and rehabilitative potential and how these factors can, and
should, influence juvenile adjudication and sentencing."' Together,
the following cases stand for the proposition that courts should look
beyond a juvenile's age and the offense committed when determining
the appropriate sentence to impose upon a minor convicted of a
serious offense. Generally, these cases establish that, "[c]hildren are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing...
[and] are less deserving of the most severe punishments.""' 8 This
Note proposes that factors, such as a juvenile's diminished culpability
and potential for reform, should be considered not only at the
sentencing phase but also when determining whether to transfer
jurisdiction to adult court. To consider the unique factors associated
with youth only at the sentencing phase ignores the potentially
detrimental impacts caused by adjudicating youth in adult courts, in
the first place.
In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons that the
imposition of the death penalty upon a juvenile offender is prohibited
115. See Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court
Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77, 82
(1996).
116. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 103, at 802.
117. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2004).
118. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
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by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment."9  At seventeen years old, Christopher Simmons
committed a vicious and violent homicide.20 Simmons was sentenced,
under a mandatory sentencing scheme, to death.'2' The Court in
Roper rejected the death penalty sentence as unconstitutional given
its disproportionate nature in light of the defendant's age and
imposed a sentence of life without possibility of parole instead.'22 It
left for future courts to decide whether reducing a sentence from the
death penalty to life without possibility of parole is an adequate
remedy.
One case to address this question was Graham v. Florida, five
years later, in 2010.123 Graham looked at the imposition of life
sentences without the possibility of parole in the context of juvenile
nonhomicide offenses.24  Graham banned the imposition of
mandatory sentences of life without possibility of parole upon
juvenile nonhomicide offenders.25  The Court held that these
mandatory penalty schemes "prevent the sentencer... from assessing
whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately
punishes a juvenile offender.'' 26 Graham held that a sentence of life
without possibility of parole is a disproportionate punishment for a
nonhomicide juvenile offense, and is thus unconstitutional.27
119. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
120. Id. at 555; Simmons discussed his plans to commit murder with friends
beforehand, and bragged about it afterward. At around 2 AM Simmons, along with one
other, broke into the home of Shirley Cook, a woman who Simmons had had a previous
car accident with, used duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her hands, and
drove her to a state park. The boys reinforced the bindings, covered her head with a
towel, and walked her over to a railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River. They tied
her hands and feet together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape, and
threw her from the bridge, drowning her. Id. at 559.
121. Id. at 556.
122. Id. at 560; "The Roper ruling affected 72 juveniles in 12 states.., most of the 72
individuals who were on death row prior to the Roper decision had their sentences
converted to life without possibility of parole." Death Penalty Information Center, U.S.
Supreme Court: Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, (Apr. 29,2015,4:32 PM), http://deathpenal
tyinfo.org/u-s-supreme-court-roper-v-simmons-no-03-633; "Between 1976 and the Roper
decision, 22 defendants were executed for crimes committed as juveniles." Death Penalty
Information Center, Facts About the Death Penalty, (Apr. 29, 2015, 4:35 PM),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
123. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52 (2010).
124. Id. at 48.
125. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).
126. Id. at 2466.
127. Id. at 2461.
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After Graham, the Court was left to decide whether a sentence
of life without possibility of parole is an appropriate sentence to
impose upon a minor convicted of a homicide offense. The Court
addressed this issue two years later in 2012.128 In Miller v. Alabama,
the Supreme Court held that mandatory life imprisonment without
parole for individuals under the age of eighteen at the time of their
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.129
The holding in Miller asserts that imposing a mandatory sentence
of life without possibility of parole upon a juvenile defendant violates
the Eighth Amendment in that it "precludes consideration of his
chronological age and its hallmark features-among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences."'"" Additionally, these mandatory sentencing schemes
fail to consider the juvenile's family and living situation, regardless of
how dysfunctional they may be.'3' Furthermore, a mandatory scheme
fails to consider the nature of a defendant's crime and the extent to
which he participated.12  Similarly, this scheme neglects to consider
any potential familial or peer pressure that may have influenced the
juvenile's actions.'33  The Court stated that, "'[j]ust as the
chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of
128. Id. at 2455; Many sentencing law advocates were surprised by the Supreme
Court's decision to review the constitutionality of life-without-parole sentences imposed
upon juveniles, fourteen years or younger, convicted of homicide crimes, so shortly after
Graham. This decision served to illustrate the Court's shifting Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and the larger debate regarding the constitutionality of imposing harsh
sentences on juveniles. Scott Hechinger, Another Bite at the Graham Cracker: The
Supreme Court's Surprise Revisiting of Juvenile Life Without Parole in Miller v. Alabama
and Jackson v. Hobbs, GEO. L. REV. ONLINE (2012), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/glj-
online/another-bite-at-the-graham-cracker-the-supreme-court% E2 80%99s-surprise-
revisiting-of-juvenile-life-without-parole-in-miller-v-alabama-and-jackson-v-hobbs/.
129. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
130. Id. at 2468.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. According to Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg in their article,
Blaming Youth, "Adolescent decisionmaking capacity is diminished as compared to adults
due to psycho-social immaturity. At the same time, the scientific evidence suggests that
most young lawbreakers are "ordinary" persons (and quite different from typical adult
criminals) in that normal developmental forces drive their criminal conduct. This is
important in two ways. First, ordinary adolescents are more vulnerable than are adults to
exogenous pressures that can lead to criminal conduct. Further, an important source of
mitigation in criminal law---evidence that the criminal act did not derive from bad moral
character-is as applicable to youths as to upstanding adults who act aberrantly." Scott &
Steinberg, supra note 103, at 802.
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great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered' in assessing
his culpability."' 34 The Court made clear that its holding is meant to
set forth a certain process for judges to follow when determining
whether it is appropriate to impose such a severe sentence on a
juvenile.' Specifically, this holding requires that judges "consider the
'mitigating qualities of youth.'136
The Court considered several such factors in Miller. Evan
Miller's mother was an alcoholic and drug addict and his stepfather
abused him. 37  He spent his youth in and out of foster care and
developed a dependency on drugs and alcohol.38  He attempted
suicide four times with the first attempt at just six years old."9 Evan
Miller was fourteen years old when he and his friend, Colby Smith,
beat and murdered his neighbor, Cole Cannon.'41 Miller and Smith
followed Cannon back to his trailer after he had completed a drug
deal with Miller's mom.' After a night of drinking, Miller attempted
to steal money from Cannon's wallet after he had fallen asleep.
2
Cannon awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat, at which point
Smith jumped in and struck Cannon with a baseball bat.43  Miller
grabbed the bat and struck Cannon repeatedly before he placed a
sheet over Cannon's face and walked out the door.44 Soon after, the
two decided to return to Cannon's trailer to cover up their crime.
4
1
134. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
(1982)).
135. Id. at 2459.
136. Id. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); Scholars have
argued since Miller was decided, that this decision does not go far enough, and that rather
than precluding only mandatory sentences of life without possibility of parole, the Court in
Miller should have placed a categorical ban on juvenile life without parole sentencing.
See, Anna K. Christensen, Rehabilitating Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Analysis of
Miller v. Alabama, CA. L. REV. CIR. 132, 133 (2013) ("Because juveniles are more apt to
engage in risky behavior than are adults, and because of their ability to respond positively
to rehabilitative services, juvenile delinquency is a poor predictor of adult criminality, and
juvenile life without parole sentences fail to achieve the penological goals they seek to
advance.").
137. Miller, 132 S. Ct., at 2469.









Miller and Smith lit two fires which, combined with Cannon's injuries,
ultimately led to his death.'46
Miller's case was quickly removed from juvenile to adult court
where he was charged as an adult with murder in the course of
arson.1 47 A jury found Miller guilty, and, in light of Alabama's
mandatory minimum sentence of life without possibility of parole for
crimes including murder by arson, Miller was sentenced to life
without possibility of parole at fourteen years old.48 The Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence, holding "life
without possibility of parole was 'not overly harsh when compared to
the crime,' and that the mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme
was permissible under the Eighth Amendment.',
49
The Supreme Court reversed, relying in large part on its
reasoning presented in Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons.°
Specifically, "Roper held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital
punishment for children, and Graham concluded that the
Amendment also prohibits a sentence of life without possibility of
parole for a child who has committed a nonhomicide offense.'.1
According to the Court, the confluence of these two lines of
precedent, categorical bans on disproportionate sentences, and
requisite individualized sentencing in capital cases, "leads to the
conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles
violate the Eighth Amendment."'52 The Court concluded that these
mandatory penalty schemes are problematic in that they:
preclude a sentencer from taking account of an
offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and
circumstances attendant to it. Under these schemes,
every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every
other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter
and the accomplice, the child from a stable household
and the child from a chaotic and abusive one."'
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2462-63.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2463 (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 2464.
151. Id. at 2463.
152. Id. at 2464.
153. Id. at 2467-68.
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These mandatory penalty schemes, by precluding a judge from
considering potential mitigating factors associated with youth,
"contravene Graham's (and also Roper's) foundational principle: that
imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders
cannot proceed as though they were not children.,154 Therefore, the
Court reversed. It held that, "the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders . . . we require [the sentencer] to take
into account how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison."'155
The Court did not deny, nor attempt to detract from, the clearly
vicious nature of Miller's crime.56 However, in light of the reasoning
presented in Graham and Roper, it recognized that the sentencing
judge was precluded from considering applicable mitigating factors
associated with Miller's age as a result of the mandatory sentencing
scheme.57 The Court, in support of its determination that certain
mitigating factors should have been considered, reiterated the grave
reality of Miller's upbringing, including his alcoholic and drug
addicted mother, abusive stepfather, and history of multiple suicide
attempts, beginning at just six-years-old.58
Miller held that a mandatory sentence of life without possibility
of parole upon a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment by
"preclude[ing] a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age
and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.
159
Therefore, the Court prescribed that sentencers, when considering
whether to sentence juvenile offenders to life without possibility of
parole, "take into account how children are different, and how those
154. Id. at 2466. Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg reject the binary
classifications of child versus adult, and focus on the unique category of "adolescence" as a
wholly separate category from both children, and adults. Scott and Steinberg urge that,
"the use of binary categories has not worked well as a framework for juvenile justice
policy, whether young offenders are treated as children, as they were in the traditional
juvenile justice system, or as adults, as they increasingly are today. Binary classification
has reinforced simplistic understandings of young offenders' criminal responsibility."
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 103, at 804. Furthermore, Scott and Steinberg argue that
because of the focus on forcing adolescents into the category of a blameless child, or a
fully culpable adult, "questions about the mitigating effects of immaturity in assessing
criminal culpability are seldom addressed." Id.




159. Id. at 2467.
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differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison.' 'lW Specifically, Miller identified the following hallmark
features of youth that should be considered before sentencing
juveniles to life without possibility of parole: immaturity, impetuosity,
failure to appreciate risks and consequences, brutal or dysfunctional
family and home environments, impacts of peer pressure, and the
circumstances of the crime itself, including the extent of the juvenile's
involvement.
161
After Miller held that imposing a mandatory sentence of life
without the possibility of parole upon a minor violates the Eighth
Amendment, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of
imposing a discretionary sentence of life without possibility of parole
in People v. Gutierrez, in 2012.162 Luis Angel Gutierrez, who was
seventeen years old when he raped and murdered his aunt, was
convicted of first-degree special circumstance murder and sentenced
to life without possibility of parole under Penal Code 190.5,
subdivision (b). 63 California Penal Code §190.5(b), an example of a
statutory exclusion provision, states that the penalty for sixteen or
seventeen-year-old juveniles who commit first-degree special
circumstance murder "shall be confinement in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole or, at the discretion court, 25 years to
life."' '6  Finding that the trial court and the California Court of
Appeal had failed to exercise discretion and consider the unique
factors associated with youth prescribed by section 190.5 and Miller,
the California Supreme Court remanded Gutierrez for resentencing in
light of the principles set forth in Miller.
65
Collectively, these cases recognize what social science research
demonstrates, which is that juveniles are fundamentally different
from adults and have certain unique characteristics associated with
their youth that render them inappropriate recipients of the law's
most severe punishments.'6 These findings emphasize the importance
of exercising judicial discretion when sentencing minors and of
abrogating the practices that sentence juveniles as adults without
consideration of their immaturity, impetuosity, and potential for
160. Id. at 2469.
161. Id. at 2468.
162. People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal. 4th 1354, 249, 252 (2012).
163. Id. at 1366-67.
164. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b) (West 2014).
165. Gutierrez, 58 Cal. 4th at 249-50.
166. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
Winter 20161 YOUTHFULNESS MATTERS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
rehabilitation.1 67  The emphasis on supporting judicial discretion
should inform the development of judicial transfer and waiver laws in
the future. As was discussed in Part II, discretionary transfer statutes
are consistent with these Supreme Court holdings as they allow for
the opportunity to consider relevant factors before making a
determination to transfer jurisdiction from juvenile to adult court. A
juvenile's case should not be directly filed in adult court or
automatically transferred to adult court because such practices fail to
consider the unique factors associated with youth as identified by
social and psychological research on juvenile development, and as
recognized by the Supreme Court, over the past decade.
IV. A Look at the Physical and Psychological Impacts of
Sentencing Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court
In light of recent Supreme Court precedent assessing the
constitutionality of imposing harsh sentences on juvenile offenders,
legislation has been passed to provide parole opportunities to the
countless youth serving life sentences in adult prisons throughout the
United States. States including Iowa, Florida, Missouri, and
Alabama, however, provide opportunities for release only after a
juvenile serves at least fifty years in prison.169  Though the
development of parole opportunities is a step in the right direction, a
look into the physical and psychological risks faced by juveniles
incarcerated in adult prisons reveals a grim situation that cannot be
sufficiently remedied by eventual release. Providing parole
opportunities fifty years down the road ignores the devastating reality
faced by juveniles in adult prisons on a daily basis. Such a remedy, it
seems, is too little, too late.
A. There Are No Adequate Means of Protecting Juveniles in Adult
Prisons
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act requires
that youth in the juvenile justice system be removed from adult jails
167. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2004).
168. Kelly Orians, One Year Later: State Level Response and Implementation of Miller
v. Alabama, NAT'L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW (Oct. 1,2013), http://youthlaw.org/publication/
one-year-later-state-level-response-and-implementation-of-miller-v-alabama/. Specifically,
states have made efforts to (1) bring their sentencing statutes into compliance with the ban
on mandatory sentencing, (2) determine whether the ruling is retroactive, (3) provide
youth with a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release, and (4) reform their
juvenile-to-adult court transfer processes in general. Id.
169. Id.
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or sight and sound separated from other adult inmates. ° However,
this protection does not apply to juveniles sentenced to adult jails or
prisons through the adult criminal justice system."' This raises the
question, how then do we protect juveniles incarcerated in adult
prisons? The answer is, unfortunately, we really have not developed
adequate means of protecting juveniles in adult prisons, and the
effects have been devastating."2
What is increasingly becoming known as the "no-win" situation,
prison guards are faced with the options of either (a) leaving juveniles
in the general adult prison population, or (b) isolating them from the
general population where they may be in complete isolation for up to
twenty-three hours a day. The integration involved in option (a)
leaves juveniles at a significantly increased risk of physical and sexual
assaults while the isolation involved in option (b) puts them at risk of
exacerbating existing mental conditions, developing depression and,
most severely, at an increased risk of committing suicide.
173
B. Juveniles Housed in Adult Prisons Face an Increased Risk of
Suicide and Sexual Victimization
The rates of suicide and sexual victimization of juveniles in adult
prisons throughout the United States illustrate the insufficiency of
providing eventual parole opportunities as an adequate remedy. By
the time many juveniles are ultimately released, the damage has been
done. Juveniles in adult prisons are subject to extreme and traumatic
sexual assaults and often develop irreparable anxiety and depression.
Worst of all, some juveniles forgo the opportunity for release
altogether as taking their own life becomes more bearable than the
reality they are forced to endure on a daily basis.
170. A Campaign for Youth Justice Report, Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of
Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, (2007),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-
JailingJuvenilesReport 2007-11-15.pdf. Sight and sound separation is required by the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, and is a provision which "seeks to
prevent children threats, intimidation, or other forms of psychological abuse and physical
assault. Under "sight and sound," children cannot be housed next to adult cells, share
dining halls, recreation areas, or any other common spaces with adults, or be placed in any
circumstance that could expose them to threats of abuse from adult offenders. Sight and
Sound Separation, COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE (Apr. 29, 2015, 5:44 PM),
http://www.juvjustice.org/juvenile-justice-and-delinquency-prevention-act/sight-and-sound
-separation.
171. Jailing Juveniles, supra note 171.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Youth are nineteen times more likely to commit suicide in jail
than youth in the general population and thirty-six times more likely
to commit suicide in adult jail than are youth housed in juvenile
detention facilities. 4 One effect of adjudicating juveniles in adult
courts is that they are housed in adult jails even if in connection to
crimes that may never lead to a conviction. This practice
demonstrates the lack of consideration our justice system puts toward
the potentially adverse impact that even short stays in adult jails or
prisons can have on incarcerated youth. Not only does incarceration
subject juveniles to an increased risk of physical and sexual violence,
but it also puts this vulnerable population at risk of influence by
hardened criminals and ignores the potential they have for
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.
76
According to Jailing Juveniles, a 2007 report by a Washington-
based advocacy group, Campaign for Youth Justice, statistics show
that suicides in jails were "heavily concentrated in the first week
spent in custody (48%) with almost a quarter of suicides taking place
on the day of admission to jail (14%) or on the following day
(9%).,
,
177 Direct file and automatic transfer statutes give judges and
prosecutors complete discretion to place children in adult criminal
jurisdiction, sentence them to a number of weeks, months, or even
years in adult prisons, and then turn a blind eye to what we know very
likely will happen to them once they get there. There must be a
greater awareness of the impacts of adjudicating juveniles in adult
criminal courts and the very real effects these can have on a juvenile's
life.
When looking at the numbers of juvenile offenders who are
physically and sexually abused in adult jails and prisons, it is
important to remember that many such crimes go unreported, so the
true numbers are unfortunately higher than reported.'78 According to
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, youth under the age of eighteen
174. Id.
175. The Editorial Board, Throwing Away Young People: Prison Suicide, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2007, 12:33 PM), http://theboard.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/throwing-away-
young-people-prison-suicide/?_r-0.
176. Id.
177. Jailing Juveniles, supra note 171, at 10 (citing C.J. Mumola, Suicide and Homicide
in State Prisons and Local Jails, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STANDARDS).
178. Aviva Shen, Teenagers in Adult Prisons More Likely to be Sexually Abused by
Staff, DOJ Finds, (May 16, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/05/16/2023
51 1/teenagers-in-adult-prisons-more-likey-to-be-sexually-abused-by-staff-doj-finds/.
[Vol. 43:2
represented 21% of all substantiated victims of inmate-on-inmate
sexual violence in jails in 2005, and 13% in 2006.'79 This number is
disproportionately high given that only 1% of inmates are juveniles.,m
A former juvenile inmate who was raped and abused while in prison
notes that, once released, juveniles are "coming back into society
indelibly marked by what they've experienced-either traumatized by
sexual assault or hyper-violent from having learned to fend off the
threat.
,1 81
These statistics on the physical and sexual abuse endured by
juveniles in adult prisons, how vulnerable juveniles are to the
influence of hardened criminals, and the increased rate of recidivism
by juveniles released from adult facilities as opposed to those leaving
juvenile facilities, clearly illustrate the mistake our justice system is
making in sentencing juveniles in the adult criminal court. Despite
research indicating that juveniles are not well served in adult prisons,
that the goals of the juvenile justice system are completely ignored,
and that juveniles will likely face traumatic abuse, state legislators
continue to enact policies and practices that grant judges and
prosecutors the authority to file juveniles' cases in adult court based
solely on the juvenile's age in combination with the crime committed.
Section V presents a proposal for states to modify their juvenile
waiver legislation to ensure that juveniles receive their
constitutionally protected due process rights before a waiver order
may be issued.
V. Proposal: Discretionary Transfer Statutes and Recent
Supreme Court Precedent Should Influence State Legislators in
Seeking the Ultimate Abrogation of Automatic Waiver Statutes
In Kent v. United States, the Court held that before a juvenile
could face transfer to adult criminal court, that juvenile had a right to
a hearing, representation by counsel, access to social service records,
and a written statement detailing the reasons in support of the
182waiver. Even though juvenile crime rates have since decreased, the
post-Kent increases in juvenile crime rates in the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s had a lasting effect on states' policies about how to best deal
179. Liz Ryan, Op-Ed: There's No Excuse for Keeping Children in Adult Prisons,
(Mar. 5, 2015, 11:47 PM), http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/03/12/op-ed-theres-no-
excuse-keeping-children-adult-prisons.
180. Id.
181. Shen, supra note 178.
182. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
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with juvenile offenders."' As a result, the parens patriae-focused
emphasis, once put toward protecting and rehabilitating juvenile
offenders, was replaced with legislation and statutes that treat
juveniles as fully culpable adults. These statutes, which facilitate the
funneling of juveniles into adult prisons throughout the United States,
continue to exist despite being in clear conflict with empirical
evidence indicating that such placements are ineffective for both
juveniles, and society as a whole.
A. Looking Ahead: The Reasons to Modernize Juvenile Waiver
Statutes
As a result of research on juvenile development in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, came the idea that there was a disconnect
between rehabilitating juveniles, and imprisoning them.'m Research
proved that juveniles were not amenable to the adult criminal justice
system's focus on punishment, and, in response, reform groups
advocated the development of a separate system.'8  Reformers
advocated the development of a system that rehabilitated juvenile
offenders rather than punishing them, in hopes that their time in a
juvenile facility would render them able to learn from their mistakes,
reenter society, and not make those same mistakes again.86
Despite research that children were not amenable to the goals of
criminal justice system, that they were not as culpable as adults, and
that they were not served by incarceration in adult prisons, the
eventual increase in juvenile crime rates in the mid-1990s changed the
treatment of juvenile offenders, and this change is evidenced by the
250,000 juveniles currently housed in adult prisons throughout the
United States.187 Empirical, psychological, and sociological research
on juvenile and adolescent development tells us not only that
imprisoning juveniles with adult criminals does not serve the juvenile,
but it also tells us that such practices fail to serve society because
juveniles in adults prisons are statistically more likely to become
recidivists than those sentenced to juvenile facilities."' Statistics
shows that juveniles sentenced to adult prisons are significantly more
likely to face physical and sexual assaults than adults housed in those
183. Hansen, supra note 33.
184. Mole & White, supra note 21, at 1.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Hansen, supra note 33; Arya, supra note 80.
188. Fagan, supra note 115.
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same prisons.89 Furthermore, prison overcrowding is a documented
and serious problem in prisons throughout the United States.90
Prisons have been unable to function effectively due to overcrowding
and, in recent years, have even been ordered to release prisoners to
reduce overpoputon.9 Despite severe overpopulation, states
continue to employ waiver statutes that funnel juvenile offenders,
many of whom are convicted of non-violent crimes, into these already
overextended prisons. Decades of research prove that sentencing
juveniles to time in adult prison does not serve the juvenile or
society.'93 In light of this research, automatic waiver statutes that
mandate juvenile adjudication in adult court, and sentencing in adult
prison, are inappropriate in today's society.
B. Automatic Waiver Statutes Should Be Abrogated in Favor of
Discretionary Statutes That Mandate a Pre-Waiver Hearing and
Original Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court
As discussed above, waiver statutes, employed in one form or
another by each of the fifty states, generally fall into one of two
categories, judicial waiver or automatic waiver.'94 Judicial waiver
statutes, comprised of discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory
statutes, are utilized in cases arising in juvenile court jurisdiction.'95
Cases subject to judicial waiver statutes originate in juvenile court
and may or may not, subject to judicial discretion, be waived to adult
court.'% Automatic waiver statutes on the other hand, consisting of
direct file and statutory exclusion statutes, allow for a judge or
prosecutor to automatically file a juvenile's case in adult criminal
court, without going through the juvenile court system."
The constitutionally required due process protection articulated
in Kent v. United States, that a juvenile court hearing be conducted
before a juvenile is transferred to adult court, simply does not apply
to cases subject to direct file or statutory exclusion statutes.98 As a
189. Shen, supra note 178.
190. Wyler, supra note 92.
191. Id.
192. Arya, supra note 80.
193. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 103.
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result, judges and prosecutors, looking generally at the juvenile's age
and the offense committed, are sentencing juvenile offenders to
overcrowded, and in all likelihood dangerous, adult prisons without
so much as an informal hearing to assess their level of culpability or
amenability to rehabilitation in a juvenile facility. If juveniles are to
be waived from juvenile to adult court, an action with the potential to
impose grave consequences on the duration of their life, they should,
at the very least, be granted their constitutionally protected right to a
hearing in juvenile court before any such waiver determination can be
made.
Of the fifty states, five states, including Connecticut, Kentucky,
North Carolina, West Virginia, and New Jersey, do not employ any
automatic waiver statutes (direct file, statutory exclusion, or "once an
adult, always an adult").'" New Jersey provides a model of what
states' juvenile waiver legislation would look like if automatic waiver
statutes were to be abrogated. Of the three subcategories of judicial
waiver, mandatory, discretionary, and presumptive, New Jersey
employs only discretionary and presumptive statutes."' Because
these are judicial, rather than automatic waiver statutes, the juvenile
court has original jurisdiction, meaning that each case subject to
waiver must begin in juvenile court.20 ' Each of New Jersey's waiver
statutes set the minimum age at which a juvenile may be eligible for
waiver at fourteen years old .2
New Jersey's discretionary waiver statute allows, on motion by
the prosecutor, the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction of a juvenile
who is at least fourteen years old and meets the statutory
offense/record criteria if it finds "(1) that there is probable cause to
believe the child committed the alleged offense and (2) that the State
has proven 'that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the
prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests
199. These five states employ the following judicial waiver statutes: Connecticut:
mandatory; Kentucky: discretionary and mandatory; North Carolina: discretionary and
mandatory; West Virginia: discretionary and mandatory; New Jersey: discretionary and
presumptive. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
Appendix: Summary of Transfer Laws, (May 11, 2015, 5:53 PM), http://www.ojjdp.gov
/pubs/tryingjuvasadult/appendix.html.
200. Id.
201. Mole & White, supra note 21, at 8.
202. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Appendix:
Summary of Transfer Laws, (May 11, 2015, 5:53 PM), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/trying
juvasadult/appendix.html.
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of the public require waiver.""'2 3 Regardless of whether the court
grants or denies the motion, all of its reasons must be stated in
writing.'O
The presumptive waiver statute in New Jersey differs from the
discretionary waiver statute in that it does not require that the State
make a showing that the public interest requires a waiver.25 In order
to waive jurisdiction in a case meeting the age/offense criteria subject
to presumptive waiver, the court needs only to find probable cause to
believe that the child committed the alleged offense.2°6 However, if
the juvenile "can show that the probability of his rehabilitation by the
use of the procedures, services and facilities available to the court
prior to.. .reaching the age of nineteen substantially outweighs the
reasons for waiver, waiver shall not be granted.
2
01
New Jersey's discretionary and presumptive waiver statutes each
mandate original jurisdiction in juvenile court and a mandatory pre-
waiver hearing and, as such, are consistent with the constitutionally
protected due process right articulated in Kent. By conducting these
hearings in juvenile court before a waiver order may be issued, the
juvenile is given the chance to demonstrate his or her amenability to
juvenile court, and the judge is required to consider the facts and
circumstances specific to that particular juvenile, and his or her
particular offense.
If more states were to model their juvenile waiver legislation
after New Jersey's, all juveniles would be granted their
constitutionally protected due process right to a pre-waiver hearing as
mandated in Kent. Such a model would not limit a state's ability to
waive jurisdiction in cases where it is warranted; it would simply
require that a juvenile's constitutional rights be protected before any
such action is taken. Ultimately, the decision whether to waive is
made by the judge, and discretionary and presumptive waiver statutes
preserve the judge's authority while, at the same time, ensuring that
the juvenile's right to due process is protected. Consistent with the
findings in Kent, and supported by Roper, Graham, Miller, and
Gutierrez, state legislators should abrogate currently enacted direct
file and statutory exclusion laws in favor of discretionary waiver laws
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before a juvenile's case can be filed in, or transferred to, adult
criminal court.
Conclusion
Abrogating automatic waiver statutes and supporting the use of
discretionary and presumptive waiver statutes preserves society's
right to protection from those juvenile offenders who truly are not
amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system while also
protecting juvenile offenders' constitutional rights. Furthermore,
presumptive and discretionary waiver statutes ensure that due
consideration is given to each juvenile's case before a waiver
determination is made. Such consideration is particularly important
in light of the potentially devastating impacts of sentencing a juvenile
to time in an adult prison. The majority of automatic waiver
legislation in place today was enacted in response to the increase in
juvenile crime from a period that ended over two decades ago.20, It is
time to allow what we know about juvenile development and the
impacts of juvenile incarceration, rather than the past, to inform the
development of modern juvenile adjudicatory laws and policies across
the United States.
208. Hansen, supra note 33.
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